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Supreme Court of Utah. 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Lawrence J. SORENSEN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 17735. 
Dec. 21, 1981. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., of 
four counts of theft, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, 617 P.2d 333, reversed and remanded. On 
remand, the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Jay E. Banks, J., entered judgment of conviction, 
and imposed sentence. Defendant appealed on 
grounds that the second sentence was illegal. The 
Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that: (1) under the 
statutory prohibition against a "more severe" second 
sentence, the second sentence cannot exceed the 
first sentence in appearance or effect, in the number 
of its elements or in the magnitude, and (2) because 
the increase in time of commitment made the 
second sentence more severe than the first, the 
sentence was invalid, and remand for resentencing 
was required. 
Remanded for resentencing. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Double Jeopardy €^>H5 
135Hkl 15 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 11 Ok 189) 
Statutory prohibition against "more severe" second 
sentence means that second sentence cannot exceed 
first in appearance or effect, in number of its 
elements or in their magnitude; thus, no new 
element of sentence can be added and no element 
can be augmented in magnitude. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-405; Const.Art. 8, § 9; 
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
second 
of sentence by 
element, since 
[2] Double Jeopardy €=^>112.1 
135Hkl 12.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 135Hkll2, 110kl89) 
Statutory prohibition against "more severe 
sentence precludes 
justifying increase in one element 
reference to decrease in another 
possibility of such trade-off could act as deterrent to 
appeal by individual defendant. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-405; Const.Art. 8, § 9; 
U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
[3] Double Jeopardy €=>H5 
135Hkl 15 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 11 Okl 93) 
After defendant's original conviction for theft, 
which carried sentence of one to 15 years in 
penitentiary, with stay of execution and placing of 
defendant on two years' probation on condition that 
he serve six months in jail and pay full restitution, 
was reversed and defendant was convicted for 
second time on remand, second sentence of one to 
15 years with no restitution, but with service of 
sentence to begin without delay, was more severe 
than first, and violated statute prohibiting more 
severe second sentence and impaired constitutional 
right to appeal. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-405; Const.Art. 
8, § 9; U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
[4] Criminal Law €=^1192 
HOkl 192 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 11 Okl 188) 
After defendant was convicted on remand when his 
original conviction was reversed, but second 
sentence was more severe than first sentence, on 
remand for resentencing, in imposing his third 
sentence, court was not required to be constrained 
by terms of invalid second sentence, but was only to 
assure that sentence it imposed was no more severe 
than first sentence. U.C.A.1953, 76- 3-405; 
Const.Art. 8, § 9; U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
*180 Nancy Bergeson, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
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David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig L. Barlow, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
OAKS, Justice: 
After his first conviction for theft was reversed for 
trial errors, State v. Sorensen, Utah, 617 P.2d 333 
(1980), defendant was re-tried and a jury again 
convicted him of theft. Defendant concedes that the 
second trial was free from error. His sole argument 
on this appeal is that the second sentence was illegal. 
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 
2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the Supreme Court 
held that due process of law requires that a 
defendant be freed from the apprehension that if he 
appeals his conviction successfully and is then 
convicted at a second trial the trial judge can 
retaliate by giving him an increased sentence. 
Consequently, the Court held, the sentence imposed 
after re-trial cannot be more severe than the original 
sentence, unless the reason for the increased 
sentence, based on identifiable conduct by the 
defendant following the original trial, appears in the 
record. 
In 1973, our Legislature implemented that 
requirement in a more stringent fashion that allows 
for no exceptions. So far as pertinent to this appeal, 
U.C.A., 1953, s 76-3-405 provides that where a 
conviction has been set aside on direct review, "the 
court shall not impose a new sentence for the same 
offense or for a different offense based on the same 
conduct which is more severe than the prior 
sentence ...." In Chess v. Smith, Utah, 617 P.2d 
341, 343 (1980), we held that section 76-3-405 also 
prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal 
(Article VIII, s 9) from being impaired "by 
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the 
error of his conviction the risk that he may be 
penalized with a harsher sentence for having done 
so." 
Following his first conviction, defendant was 
sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the penitentiary, but 
execution of that sentence was stayed and he was 
placed on two years' probation on the condition that 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No CI 
Page 2 
he serve six months in the Salt Lake County jail and 
pay full restitution (approximately $45,000). After 
his second conviction, defendant was sentenced on 
May 5, 1981, to 1 to 15 years. No restitution was 
required, but service of sentence was ordered to 
begin without delay. By December 18, 1981, when 
this case *181 was submitted for decision by this 
Court, defendant had been confined for more than 
the six months he would have served under the first 
sentence. 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to be 
resentenced to not more than six months, which 
would result in his immediate release. The state 
argues that the second sentence is not "more severe" 
so long as it gives credit in its maximum term for 
time already served under the first sentence (none, 
in this case) and so long as the combination of 
elements in the second sentence does not outweigh 
the combination in the original sentence. We find 
the state's arguments unpersuasive. 
(1)(2) In the context of the due process requirement 
of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, which seeks to 
assure that there is no chilling or deterring of the 
criminal defendant's exercise of his basic 
constitutional right to appeal, and in light of the 
Utah constitutional constraint against impairing the 
right to appeal, as articulated in Chess v. Smith, 
supra, we think the meaning of our statutory 
prohibition against a "more severe" second sentence 
is clear. The second sentence cannot exceed the 
first in appearance or effect, in the number of its 
elements, U.C.A., 1953, s 76-3-201, or in their 
magnitude. This means that no new element of 
sentence can be added and that no element can be 
augmented in magnitude. It also precludes 
justifying an increase in one element of a sentence 
by reference to a decrease in another element (in 
this case, elimination of restitution while increasing 
actual time to be served). This is because the 
possibility of such a tradeoff could act as a deterrent 
to appeal by an individual defendant. 
(3)(4) Because the increase in time of commitment 
made the second sentence in this case more severe 
than the first, the sentence was contrary to section 
76-3-405, and also invalid as impairing the 
aim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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constitutional right to appeal as explained in Chess 
v. Smith, supra. Because the record contains no 
reason for the increased sentence, it is also contrary 
to the due process requirement articulated in North 
Carolina v. Pearce, supra. The sentence is therefore 
vacated and the case is remanded for re-sentencing 
in conformity with section 76-3-405, as construed in 
this opinion. Although that statute requires the 
court to deduct "the portions of the prior sentence 
previously satisfied," which would include time 
served under the second sentence, in imposing its 
third sentence the court need not be constrained by 
the terms of the invalid second sentence. The 
sentencing court need only assure that the sentence 
it now imposes is no more severe than the first 
sentence. 
In view of the special circumstances of this case, 
the remittitur of this Court will issue instanter, 
notwithstanding the normal rule of Utah R.Civ.P. 
76(d). 
So ordered. 
HALL, C. J., STEWART and HOWE, JJ., and 
CHRISTINE DURHAM, District Judge, concur. 
639P.2dl79 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Blaine HORROCKS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 990411-CA. 
Jan. 5,2001. 
Defendant moved to dismiss felony charges on 
ground that they were barred by double jeopardy 
because of his pleas in the Justice Court to various 
misdemeanor offenses arising out of same incident. 
The Fourth District Court, Provo Department, 
Anthony W. Schofield, J., denied motion, and 
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to use or 
possession of psilocybin and use or possession of 
marijuana. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, P.J., held that: (1) jeopardy 
attached when justice court accepted defendant's 
pleas to misdemeanor offenses; (2) manifest 
necessity existed to allow misplea and dismissal of 
misdemeanor charges, such that prosecution could 
proceed on new information without violating 
double jeopardy. 
district court's decision affirming 
U.C.A.1953, 78-5-120. 
the dismissal. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €=>1134(8) 
1 lOkl 134(8) Most Cited Cases 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
dismiss presents a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. 
[2] Criminal Law €^>260.13 
110k260.13 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant exhausted his right to appeal from justice 
court's dismissal of misdemeanor offenses in favor 
of subsequent felony information when he appealed 
to district court under statute providing for trial de 
novo, and he had no right thereafter to appeal 
[3] Judgment €^642 
228k642 Most Cited Cases 
Issue of whether double jeopardy barred State's 
reprosecution of defendant on felony charges was 
not barred on basis of res judicata or other legal 
principles by earlier appeal of justice court's 
dismissal of misdemeanor offenses arising out of 
same incident, where issue in that case was whether 
signed final order was ever issued on defendant's 
pleas and thus whether those charges could be 
dismissed. 
[4] Double Jeopardy € ^ 5 7 
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases 
Jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a guilty 
plea; entry of the plea, rather than the actual 
imposition of the sentence, is the critical moment 
for determining jeopardy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5 
[5] Criminal Law €^274(3.1) 
110k274(3.1) Most Cited Cases 
[5] Double Jeopardy €=>57 
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases 
Jeopardy attaches once a plea is accepted by the 
court, but the plea can be set aside upon a showing 
of manifest necessity before sentencing and 
judgment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[6] Sentencing and Punishment €^>2279 
350Hk2279 Most Cited Cases 
Where, in orally sentencing defendant, the court has 
expressly declined to impose a final sentence until it 
has had the opportunity to review sentencing 
information, court may change sentencing prior to 
entering final signed sentencing order. 
[7] Double Jeopardy €=^>57 
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases 
' 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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[7] Sentencing and Punishment €^>2279 
350Hk2279 Most Cited Cases 
Although jeopardy attaches when a plea is accepted 
by a trial court, the court may (1) change an oral 
sentencing decision when it has specifically 
reserved that option pending receipt of further 
information relevant to sentencing and the 
sentencing decision is not binding on the court until 
a final written order is entered; or (2) declare a 
misplea in limited circumstances where there is 
"manifest necessity" to do so and double jeopardy 
will not then preclude reprosecution. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
[8] Double Jeopardy €^>57 
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases 
Jeopardy attached when justice court accepted 
defendant's pleas to misdemeanor offenses, even 
though final sentencing order was never entered, 
such that justice court might thereafter vacate its 
acceptance of pleas and dismiss those charges 
without violating double jeopardy only upon 
showing of manifest necessity and lack of undue 
prejudice to defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[9] Criminal Law €^274(3.1) 
110k274(3.1) Most Cited Cases 
Manifest necessity justified withdrawal of the 
justice court's acceptance of defendant's pleas to 
misdemeanor charges based on defendant's acts in 
intentionally deceiving the court, by misleading 
court into believing, when court could not find its 
copy of misdemeanor traffic citation on day 
defendant appeared, that charges on his copy of 
citation were all of the charges pending from 
incident, and by his later attempt to claim that court 
system computer entry was final sentencing order, 
even though was never signed by judge and never 
intended to be actual signed court order. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
[10] Criminal Law €^274(3.1) 
110k274(3.1) Most Cited Cases 
In order to allow a misplea, it must be shown that 
defendant will not suffer undue prejudice; misplea 
is allowed unless defendant has taken some 
affirmative action which would materially and 
substantially affect the outcome of a subsequent 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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retrial. 
[11] Double Jeopardy € ^ 5 7 
135Hk57 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant suffered no undue prejudice that would 
present double jeopardy bar to vacating acceptance 
of his pleas to misdemeanor charges and dismissing 
them in favor of refiling of new felony charges, 
where defendant was placed in essentially the same 
position as he was prior to misplea; defendant did 
not rely to his detriment on plea or confess to any 
crimes or provide details which compromised his 
ability to defend himself in subsequent action. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
*1146 Shelden R. Carter, Harris & Carter, Provo, 
for Appellant. 
Jan Graham, Attorney General, and Joanne C. 
Slotnik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and DAVIS and 
THORNE, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
**1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss, arguing that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause and the Single Criminal Episode 
Act bar the State's reprosecution of charges against 
him. Defendant claims the Payson Justice Court 
previously received his pleas, sentenced him, and 
issued a final order, barring any further State action 
against him for charges arising out of the July 21, 
1996 auto accident. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 On July 21, 1996, defendant was involved in a 
traffic accident in Utah County. At the time of the 
accident, police issued a traffic citation for only the 
misdemeanor offenses of no insurance, driving on a 
suspended* 1147 license, and failure to yield. 
Because the citation was for class B or C 
misdemeanors, the local justice court had 
jurisdiction to hear these charges. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-5-104(1) (Supp.2000). The citation 
iim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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directed defendant to appear for court no earlier 
than five days, but no later than fourteen days after 
it was issued. Accordingly, defendant appeared at 
the Pay son Justice Court on July 29, 1996—eight 
days after receiving the citation. 
**3 When defendant appeared in court, the court 
clerk was unable to locate the court's copy of the 
misdemeanor traffic citation. In order to 
accommodate defendant, the clerk made a copy of 
the citation defendant brought with him and entered 
it into the computer. A copy of the citation was 
given to the judge who used it to conduct the 
hearing. Defendant then pleaded no contest to the 
driving on a suspended license charge and guilty to 
the failure to yield and no insurance charges. After 
defendant pleaded to the charges, the court orally 
sentenced defendant with fines and jail time. The 
court suspended part of the fine and all of the jail 
time upon completion of court ordered probation. 
**4 After the court accepted defendant's pleas and 
orally imposed sentence, the court apparently 
realized a mistake had been made when it found its 
original copy of the misdemeanor citation. The 
original citation had "voided" written on it and a 
new citation was attached to it. As the clerk later 
testified, none of the information about the plea and 
sentence was entered into the court's computer 
system and no final judgment was ever created or 
signed. 
**5 About a week after the July 29th hearing, the 
Pay son City attorney moved the justice court to 
dismiss the case without prejudice. Despite 
defendant's objection, the justice court granted the 
motion to dismiss. Because defendant wished to 
appeal the grant of the motion to dismiss, he asked 
the justice court to produce a computer entry record 
of the July 29th hearing. Defendant then appealed 
the justice court's grant of the motion to dismiss to 
the Fourth District Court. 
**6 The district court held a de novo hearing 
addressing defendant's claim. Judge John C. 
Backlund issued his Findings of Fact and Order on 
March 17, 1997, dismissing defendant's appeal. 
Judge Backlund signed another order dismissing the 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No CI; 
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appeal on May 8, 1997. [FN1] Defendant appealed 
Judge Backlund's orders to this court, and we 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
FN1. The State prepared the first order, 
dated March 17, and defendant prepared 
the second order dated May 8. There is no 
indication in the record of a reason for 
signing both orders. 
**7 On January 23, 1997, the county attorney filed 
an information charging defendant with six criminal 
counts arising from the July 21, 1996 auto 
accident. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that this action could not proceed because 
the State was barred under both the Single Criminal 
Episode Act and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The 
district court, Judge Anthony Schofield presiding, 
held a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. 
During this hearing, the State produced as the sole 
witness, Marley Lazenby, the Payson Justice Court 
clerk. Ms. Lazenby testified about the events that 
took place during the July 29th hearing and 
subsequent computer document generated on 
September 11th. The clerk testified that under 
normal circumstances she would enter the 
information from the hearing into the computer in 
order to produce a final judgment. This final 
judgment would reflect the charges, plea, and 
sentence, and would subsequently be signed by the 
judge and mailed to the parties. On 
cross-examination, the clerk testified that the court 
always prepares these final judgments and the judge 
always signs them. After Ms. Lazenby's testimony, 
defense counsel requested additional time to present 
rebuttal evidence to show that the justice court 
routinely fails to produce, sign, and mail final 
judgments to the parties. The court allowed 
defense counsel an additional ten days to submit 
further evidence to the court. The State 
subsequently brought a motion to strike the 
evidentiary hearing based partially on defendant's 
failure to provide the court with any rebuttal 
evidence. The district court granted the State's 
motion, *1148 and noted that defendant had failed 
to provide any further evidence. 
**8 Judge Schofield later issued an order 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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concluding that the current proceeding did not 
constitute double jeopardy. Specifically, Judge 
Schofield determined that Judge Backlund had 
already held that the justice court had not entered a 
final judgment and therefore no jeopardy had 
attached. 
**9 Defendant then entered conditional guilty 
pleas to use or possession of psilocybin and use or 
possession of marijuana. Defendant now appeals 
the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] **10 Because we are limited to reviewing 
Judge Schofield's order, we address only 
defendant's claim that this action constitutes double 
jeopardy. [FN2] Thus, the issue before us is 
whether double jeopardy precludes the 
reprosecution of defendant in this action. A trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss 
presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness. See State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 
060, t 6, 975 P.2d 505, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1999). 
FN2. Because we conclude that double 
jeopardy does not bar the prosecution of 
this case, we do not address defendant's 
claim under the Single Criminal Episode 
Act. 
ANALYSIS 
[2] **11 To the extent that defendant seeks to 
reverse the justice court's dismissal of the 
misdemeanor charges, we lack jurisdiction to 
consider that argument. As we previously ruled 
when defendant sought to appeal Judge Backlund's 
decision, section 78-5-120 governs appeals from a 
justice court, providing: "Any person not satisfied 
with a judgment rendered in a justice court ... is 
entitled to a trial de novo in the district court.... The 
judgment after trial de novo may not be appealed 
unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 
(Supp.2000). Defendant therefore exhausted his 
right to appeal the justice court's dismissal of the 
charges when he appealed to Judge Backlund. See 
Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 050, 1| 9, 975 P.2d 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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946 (holding the right of appeal in criminal matters 
is satisfied by right to de novo trial in district court); 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853, 
854 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (per curiam) (holding 
appeal of district court de novo review of justice 
court judgment is not allowed unless it involves the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance), affd, 
788 P.2d 513, 519 (Utah 1990). 
**12 Although we do not address whether the 
justice court erred in dismissing the charges, we can 
examine Judge Schofield's ruling that this case does 
not constitute double jeopardy because there was no 
final order and therefore jeopardy did not attach to 
the prior proceeding in the justice court. In his 
order, Judge Schofield stated that Judge Backlund 
"has previously addressed the issue of double 
jeopardy," and "[t]he court declines to review Judge 
Backlund's ruling on the issue of double 
jeopardy." Our review of Judge Backlund's orders, 
however, indicates that Judge Backlund never 
addressed nor even mentioned the issue of whether 
jeopardy had attached. Instead, Judge Backlund 
merely found that the justice court had never 
entered a final signed order, and thus the charges 
could be dismissed. [FN3] 
FN3. The first of Judge Backlund's orders 
cited, without comment, State v. Wright, 
904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah Ct.App.1995) 
where we stated: "It is the law of this 
state, as announced in State v. Curry, 814 
P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (per 
curiam), that a sentence is not entered until 
it has been reduced to writing and signed 
by the court." 
[3] **13 Consequently, it is clear that Judge 
Backlund never issued any ruling concerning 
defendant's double jeopardy claim, and it is likely 
that jeopardy was not even raised as an issue in the 
appeal to Judge Backlund. Because Judge Schofield 
relied on Judge Backlund's legal conclusion, both 
district court orders focused on whether the justice 
court issued a final signed order. Judge Schofield 
was not required by the doctrine of res judicata or 
other legal principles to rule in conformity with 
Judge Backlund on the issue of when and if 
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jeopardy attached, since Judge Backlund did not 
address *1149 the issue. As a parallel 
consequence, we are able to review Judge 
Schofield's order, which held, for the first time, that 
double jeopardy did not preclude the charges 
against defendant in this case. 
[4] **14 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides 
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. 
Const.amend. V. A double jeopardy claim presents 
two questions. "The first is whether jeopardy in 
fact 'attached' when the trial court accepted 
[defendant's] first plea. The second is whether, if 
jeopardy did attach, a reprosecution of the case is 
permitted." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1024 
(Utah Ct.App.1996). The Utah Supreme Court has 
observed that it is well settled "that jeopardy 
attaches when a court accepts a guilty plea and that 
the entry of the plea, rather than the actual 
imposition of the sentence, is the critical moment 
for determining jeopardy." State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 
1294, 1302 (Utah 1986) (internal citations omitted); 
see also Moss, 921 P.2d at 1024. Thus, under the 
facts of this case, the trial court's ruling is at odds 
with the accepted rule that, notwithstanding whether 
the justice court entered a final signed order, 
jeopardy attached when the justice court accepted 
defendant's guilty pleas. This case highlights what 
appear to be seemingly conflicting rules in Utah's 
appellate decisions. 
**15 The First Circuit discussed the differing 
approaches to this issue. See United States v. Cruz, 
709 F.2d 111, 114 (1st Cir.1983). In Cruz, the 
court noted that some courts have determined "that 
jeopardy should attach to a guilty plea only upon 
the imposition of sentence and formal 
pronouncement or entry of judgment. This would 
give maximum flexibility to the court while still 
fixing a clear point of finality and repose." Id. 
(citing United States v. Combs, 634 F.2d 1295, 
1298 (10th Cir.1980)); see also Curry, 814 P.2d at 
1151 (court can impose higher sentence than it 
originally orally imposed where court does not 
reduce first oral sentence to final written and signed 
order); State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102-03 
(Utah Ct.App.1995) (oral sentence that is not 
reduced to final written and signed order can be 
modified by the court and does not violate double 
jeopardy). In Cruz, however, the First Circuit 
rejected the requirement that a final signed order is 
necessary for jeopardy to attach and merely 
required the acceptance of a guilty plea by the trial 
court. See Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114. The Cruz court, 
however, went on to craft a narrow exception 
allowing a court to abrogate an accepted plea, 
accompanied by detachment of jeopardy. The court 
analogize[d] judicial abortion of a previously 
accepted guilty plea and plea bargain to judicial 
declaration of a mistrial after jeopardy has 
attached—i.e., to hold that jeopardy attaches upon 
acceptance of the guilty plea, but to allow the 
district court to rescind acceptance at any time 
before sentencing and judgment upon a showing 
of 'manifest necessity,' the standard for declaring 
a mistrial over the defendant's objection. 
Id. (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 
505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978)). 
[5] **16 In Kay, the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the rule announced in Cruz, that jeopardy attaches 
once a plea is accepted by the court, but the plea 
can be set aside upon a showing of "manifest 
necessity." See id., Ill P.2d at 1303; see also 
Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025-26. By accepting the 
approach adopted by the First Circuit, the supreme 
court implicitly rejected the rule that a final signed 
order is required before jeopardy attaches. See 
Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114 (rejecting requirement of 
"imposition of sentence and formal pronouncement 
or entry of judgment"). 
**17 In Moss, the trial court accepted defendant's 
plea in abeyance to attempted sexual abuse of a 
child. See id., 921 P.2d at 1022. Later, the court 
was informed that defendant's plea violated a 
statutory prohibition against acceptance of a plea in 
abeyance in cases involving victims under the age 
of fourteen. See id. at 1023. Upon learning that 
defendant's plea was illegal, the trial court set aside 
defendant's plea and set the matter for a preliminary 
hearing. See id. On appeal, defendant argued that 
the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea was a 
final adjudication which barred the subsequent 
*1150 trial on the same charges. See id. at 1024. 
) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://print.westlawxom/delivery.html?format=HTMLE&d^ 6/9/2006 
Page 7 of 9 
17 P.3d 1145 
17 P.3d 1145, 412 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 UT App 4 
(Cite as: 17 P.3d 1145, 2001 UT App 4) 
Page 6 
**18 Applying Kay, this court concluded that 
jeopardy attached when the trial court accepted 
defendant's plea in abeyance. See id. at 1024-25. 
Specifically, this court declined to find Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable 
because it only allows the denial of a plea prior to 
its acceptance by the court. See id. at 1024. 
Instead, this court determined that Kay controlled 
the issue and that jeopardy attached when the trial 
court accepted and approved defendant's plea. See 
id. at 1024-25. 
**19 In this case, however, the trial court relied on 
Carry and Wright, holding that since the justice 
court had not reduced the oral sentence to a final 
written and signed order the case could be 
dismissed and new charges could be filed without 
offending double jeopardy. We believe, however, 
that Curry and Wright do not resolve defendant's 
claim that the justice court's acceptance of his guilty 
plea and oral imposition of a sentence placed him in 
jeopardy and that the newly filed charges 
constituted double jeopardy. 
**20 For example, in Curry, a short per curiam 
opinion, the trial court accepted defendant's guilty 
plea and orally sentenced defendant to concurrent 
sentences. See id., 814 P.2d at 1150. Defendant 
then moved the court to set aside the sentence and 
order a ninety-day evaluation, which the court 
granted. See id. In granting defendant's motion, 
the court's minute entry stated that it was not 
signing the sentence previously entered and that 
sentencing was continued until after the ninety-day 
evaluation. See id. After the ninety-day evaluation, 
the court sentenced defendant to the same prison 
term, but ordered them served consecutively. See 
id. Upholding the trial court's order sentencing 
defendant to consecutive prison terms, this court 
held that "a judgment and sentence is not final and 
appealable where the court orally finds defendant 
guilty and sentences him but fails to enter written 
findings of fact and a judgment." Id. at 1151. 
Curry, however, did not address double jeopardy at 
all, and thus it cannot stand for the proposition that 
jeopardy attached only after the court entered a final 
signed order. See id. 
**21 Similarly, in Wright, defendant pleaded 
guilty, and the court ordered a presentence report 
from Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P) and set a 
sentencing date. See id., 904 P.2d at 1102. The 
court had not received the presentence report by the 
date set for sentencing, and it reordered the report 
and continued sentencing. See id. At the next 
sentencing hearing, the court still had not received 
the presentence report from AP & P. See id. At 
defense counsel's request, the court orally sentenced 
defendant, but suspended the prison term pending 
defendant's successful completion of probation. 
See id. The court, however, expressly declined to 
sign the sentencing papers until it had a chance to 
review the presentence report. See id. After 
reviewing the presentence report, the court 
sentenced defendant to the same prison term, but 
declined to suspend the term with probation. See id. 
Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the 
imposition of a more severe sentence constituted 
double jeopardy. See id. 
**22 Addressing defendant's claim, this court 
extended the ruling in Curry to a double jeopardy 
claim, and determined that defendant could not 
legally have suffered double jeopardy until the court 
entered a final signed order. See id. at 1102-03. 
Specifically, this court stated that defendant 
received only one sentence for his conviction, and 
thus was not "placed twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense." Id. at 1103. 
[6] **23 On the surface, the rule in Wright, 
requiring a final signed order before jeopardy 
attaches, appears to conflict with the rule in Kay, 
Moss, and Cruz, requiring only acceptance of the 
plea before jeopardy attaches. Neither Wright nor 
Curry, however, discuss Kay as controlling law 
because, unlike Kay, Moss, and Cruz, neither the 
court nor the State in either case sought to set aside 
defendant's plea. Rather, both decisions really 
address the ability of the court to change sentencing 
after orally announcing it, but prior to entering it in 
a final signed sentencing order. In both Wright and 
Curry, the court had issued statements expressly 
declining to enter a final judgment until it *1151 
had the opportunity to review a presentence report. 
See Curry, 814 P.2d at 1150; Wright, 904 P.2d at 
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1102. Thus, the rule adopted in Curry and Wright 
is proper in cases where the court has expressly 
declined to impose a final sentence until it has had 
the opportunity to review sentencing information. 
In that context, the requirement of a final signed 
order signals that the court has issued its final 
decision on sentencing and jeopardy attaches at that 
point to preclude further modification of the 
sentence. 
**24 On the other hand, Kay, Moss, and Cruz are 
cases where the court accepted defendant's guilty 
plea and later attempted to set aside the plea in 
order to allow the State to retry defendant on the 
same charges. In these cases, jeopardy attached 
once the court accepted defendants' pleas and orally 
sentenced them. Thus, Kay, Moss, and Cruz are 
distinguishable from and consistent with Wright and 
Curry for two reasons: (1) Kay, Moss, and Cruz 
address the situation where the court is asked to 
declare a misplea in order to allow defendant to be 
retried; and (2) those cases do not address a court's 
power to modify an oral sentencing decision. 
Furthermore, this court cannot disregard or overturn 
decisions of the supreme court, and therefore Kay is 
controlling precedent. [FN4] 
FN4. We note, as did the Moss opinion, 
see Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025 n. 8, that the 
continued viability of Cruz in the First 
Circuit is questionable. See United States 
v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 619- 20 
(1st Cir. 1987). 
[7] **25 The legal principles established by the 
foregoing analysis are as follows: Jeopardy 
attaches when a plea is accepted by a trial court. A 
trial court, however, may (1) change an oral 
sentencing decision when it has specifically 
reserved that option pending receipt of further 
information relevant to sentencing and the 
sentencing decision is not binding on the court until 
a final written order is entered; or (2) declare a 
misplea in limited circumstances where there is 
"manifest necessity" to do so and double jeopardy 
will not then preclude reprosecution. 
[8] **26 In applying these principles to this case, 
we accept, as we must, the ruling of Judge Backlund 
that a final order was not entered by the justice 
court. Jeopardy, however, attached when the 
justice court accepted defendant's pleas. By then 
dismissing the case, the justice court essentially 
declared a misplea. The State then refiled the same 
charges and additional felony charges against 
defendant in district court. 
**27 "[Concluding jeopardy attaches, begins, 
rather than ends our inquiry as to whether double 
jeopardy bars defendant's retrial." Moss, 921 P.2d 
at 1025. Under Kay and Moss, if manifest 
necessity exists, a court may vacate an accepted 
guilty plea without violating a defendant's right 
against double jeopardy. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 
1305; Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025. The justice court 
could only rescind its acceptance of the guilty plea 
and dismiss the misdemeanor charges "based on a 
showing of 'manifest necessity' and 'no undue 
prejudice to the defendant.' " Moss, 921 P.2d at 
1025 (quoting Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305). Because 
Judge Backlund and Judge Schofield did not reach 
defendant's double jeopardy claim, neither judge's 
order addresses whether there was manifest 
necessity justifying withdrawal of the justice court's 
acceptance of defendant's guilty plea. Whether 
manifest necessity exists is a question of law. See 
Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305; Moss, 921 P.2d at 1026. 
**28 In Kay, the court addressed several 
circumstances which would justify rescinding 
acceptance of a plea. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305. 
These include instances when accepting the plea is 
the result of an "obvious reversible error," id., or 
when the terms of the plea agreement are later 
found to be illegal. Moss, 921 P.2d at 1024, 1028. 
In addition, the supreme court 
recognized: "Declaration of a misplea also seems 
reasonable in situations where some fraud or 
deception by one party leads to the acceptance of 
the plea agreement by the other party or the court." 
Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305. Manifest necessity, 
however, does not exist when a court "simply 
change [s] its mind on the basis of information in 
the presentence report, at least where that 
information revealed less than fraud on the court." 
Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114-15, 
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*1152 [9] **29 When defendant appealed the 
justice court's dismissal to the district court, Judge 
Backlund issued two signed final orders. Both the 
State and defendant prepared orders which the 
judge ultimately signed. In the order prepared by 
defense counsel, the following finding of fact was 
made: 
[T]he defendant came into the Payson City 
Justice Court with the citation that contained the 
Class B Misdemeanor of Driving on Suspension, 
Failure to Yield and no insurance. The citation 
for DUI was written on a separate citation and 
other charges were sent to the County Attorney 
for determination and review of the charges. The 
court did not have the original citation, however, 
the defendant gave the court a copy of his 
misdemeanor citation. Defendant misled the 
court into thinking that those were all of the 
charges. The court allowed him to make a plea 
and issued an oral sentence. 
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the justice court 
clerk testified that she produced the computer entry 
of the proceedings at defendant's request, sometime 
in early September. Defendant attempted to claim 
this entry, which was never signed by the judge and 
never intended to be the actual final signed court 
order, was the final court order. Based on Judge 
Backlund's finding of fact and the clerk's testimony, 
the evidence suggests that defendant consistently 
engaged in tactics to mislead the court and avoid 
punishment for the felony charges. Thus, 
defendant's acts of intentionally deceiving the court 
fall into the circumstances contemplated by Kay as 
sufficient to justify manifest necessity. 
[10] **30 Finally, in order to allow a misplea, it 
must be shown that defendant will not suffer undue 
prejudice. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305. In Kay, 
defendant confessed to committing multiple 
murders and gave specific details of the crime. See 
id. at 1306. Defendant argued that allowing a 
misplea would provide the State with a "road map" 
in a subsequent trial. See id. Nevertheless, the 
court held that since his confession would be 
inadmissible in the subsequent trial defendant 
would not suffer undue prejudice. See id. at 1307. 
**31 In Moss, we stated that a misplea is allowed 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 8 
unless defendant "has taken some affirmative action 
which would materially and substantially affect the 
outcome of a subsequent retrial. Where the 
defendant is simply placed in the same position as 
he or she was prior to the guilty plea, there is no 
undue prejudice to the defendant." Id., 921 P.2d at 
1027. 
[11] **32 Given the facts of this case, which are 
much less egregious than in Kay, defendant suffered 
no undue prejudice by allowing the dismissal of the 
misdemeanor charges and the refiling of new 
charges. Defendant has not shown that he relied to 
his detriment on the plea entered in the justice 
court. Nor did defendant confess to any crimes or 
provide details which compromised his ability to 
defend himself in the subsequent action. Rather, 
defendant was placed in essentially the same 
position as he was prior to misplea. 
CONCLUSION 
**33 We hold that jeopardy attached when the 
justice court accepted defendant's guilty pleas. To 
the extent that the district court determined that 
double jeopardy would not be implicated by 
dismissing these charges and allowing the State to 
refile charges, it was in error. Nevertheless, 
manifest necessity exists to allow a misplea in this 
case. Thus, defendant could properly be 
reprosecuted on the original three misdemeanor 
charges as well as the additional charges contained 
in the subsequent information. 
**34 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. 
**35 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, 
and WILLIAM A. THORNE, Jr., Judge. 
17 P.3d 1145, 412 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2001 UT 
App 4 
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Appellant/Defendant I homas Max Jaramillo ("Jaramillo" or "'Appellant") appeals 
from a final judgment of conviction for Burglary of a Vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of
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n is.K r.,ai i utciii Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (2003) cvu- d b liie 
Honorable Robin W. Reese, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. 1 his Court has 
jwii.Ai.jjon over criminal convictions ou^i ,.M;. nrst ucgax ;donies. I Itah Code .Ann. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue. AVneinc; .;.w . . . , . ^ consecutive jail terms whcic nil lid 
not designate the terms as consecutive in the written order of judgment entered into the 
record at the original sentencing? 
Standard of Review: I he stai idai d c i i e\ iew on sentencing issues is an abuse of 
d i s c - - r See State v. Perez, 2002 U 1 App AH, n • I 
1 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 77:5-6. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statute and constitutional provisions are in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2003); 
U.S. Const, amend. V; 
Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 20, 2002, Mr. Jaramillo was charged with two counts of burglary of 
a vehicle, class A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204, two counts 
of criminal mischief, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
106(l)(c), two counts of theft, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (2003), and public intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Salt 
Lake City Ordinance § 11.12.060. R. 1-2. On February 26, 2003, Mr. Jaramillo pled 
guilty to one count of burglary of a vehicle, a class A misdemeanor; criminal mischief, a 
class B misdemeanor; and intoxication, a class C misdemeanor. R. 19-20. 
On September 12, 2003, Judge Robin Reese signed a final written order of 
judgment sentencing Mr. Jaramillo to 365 days in jail for the burglary conviction and 180 
days in jail for the criminal mischief conviction. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C. Judge 
Reese suspended 315 days of the burglary sentence and all of the 180 days for the 
criminal mischief conviction. R. 28; Addendum C. Mr. Jaramillo was placed on 
probation for 2 years, ordered to pay $1200 in restitution, and perform 50 hours of 
community service. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C. 
2 
On February 9, 2004, an Order to Show Cause hearing was held where Mr 
Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation I .-o_ -.... *,.-
 4. iu; w H.U louiu; Tr 
trial court imposed the 315 cays in jail for the burglary conviction, suspending all ex, 
60 days. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial court ordered credit for the 60 days w aramiho 
w • 1 Mr. 
Jaramillo on probation for 3 years for the binglary conviction. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial 
court re-imposed the 180 day sentence for the criminal mischief conviction, suspending 
ii II II Il  mi ill II 1 i I ''mi 1 Hi m i I p i ! in M I I1 II mi I in I in in in mi II II in I in mi b i l l i o n I nine win loi I In 
criminal mischief conviction, to run concurrently with the first term of probation. R. 
76:7. 
Oi I Decen lbei 13 200 Il , ai i Order to Show Cai lse heat ing v\ as 1 le Id w here Mr. 
Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation. R. 77:2-3 The trial court found Mr. 
Jaramillo in violation of his probation and revoked it, ^ 6 : Addendum A, The trial 
giving credit for the time most recently served. R. 61; 77:6; Addendum A. The trial 
court also revoked Mr. Jaramillo's probation on the criminal ....-di^ f conviction and re-
ini | i )'M ill llit I I'll (hi', iiispi ii'iuln! T h i nl in '\<ldti II ill II II in in in , Il lu< I I M I i riii i t ordered the 
sentences to be served consecutively.'' R. 61; 77:6. Mr. Jaramillo timely appealed. R. 
62-69. 
1
 However, on the signed minme oiuei u\ Sentence, Judgment, Commitment the trial 
court did not note that the ^ mmrr^ w crc to run consecutively. See Addendum A. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Jaramillo pled guilty to one count of burglary of a vehicle, a class A 
misdemeanor; criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor; and intoxication, a class C 
misdemeanor. R. 19. The trial court sentenced Mr. Jaramillo to 365 days in jail for the 
burglary conviction and 180 days in jail for the criminal mischief conviction. R. 28; 
94:3-4; Addendum C. The trial court suspended 315 days of the burglary sentence and 
all of the 180 days for the criminal mischief conviction. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C. 
The trial court placed Mr. Jaramillo on probation for 2 years, ordered to pay $1200 in 
restitution, and perform 50 hours of community service. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C. A 
final order of sentence, judgment and commitment was signed and entered into the record 
on September 12, 2003. R. 28; 94:3-4; Addendum C. 
On February 9, 2004, the trial court held an Order to Show Cause hearing where 
Mr. Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation. R. 76:2-3. The trial court found Mr. 
Jaramillo in violation of his probation and imposed the 315 days in jail for the burglary 
conviction but suspended all except 60 days of it. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial court also 
ordered credit for the 60 days Mr. Jaramillo would serve on his burglary conviction. R. 
52-54; 76:6-7. Mr. Jaramillo probation was modified and he was placed on probation for 
3 years for the burglary conviction. R. 52-54; 76:6. The trial court re-imposed the 180 
day sentence for the criminal mischief conviction but suspended all of it. R. 52-54; 76:7. 
Mr. Jaramillo was placed on probation for one year for the criminal mischief conviction, 
to run concurrently with the first term of probation. R. 52-54; 76:7. 
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On December 13, 2004, another Order to Show Cause hearing was held where Mr. 
Jaramillo admitted to violating his probation R. 3 i; ::2 3 1 1 i " tr ial court, informed Mr. 
and he would serve "about 435 days jail." R 77:3. Defense counsel argued that the 
docket indicated that absent a notation that the sentences were originally ordered to run 
requested that if Mr. Jaramillo's probation is revoked then his sentence should be that he 
receive 255 days for the burglary of the vehicle conviction with the aays for the 
ci ii i lii ial i i lischief coi I s i ::ti : it I ill: ;: i: i n I z :: i l z\ in: i: si ltb R ) J :6 
The trial court revoked Mr. Jaramillo's probation R 77:6; Addendum \ he 
trial court imposed cm wf the suspended sentence for the burglary of u ., ni^e conviction, 
L>'\ ini : i r e ' -.*< m t l * . *\ i n t 
also revoked Mr. Jaramillo"^ probation on the criminal mischief conviction am: it 
imposed the 180 days suspended . .w, /xuucndwn A However, the trial court 
oi dei eel, the sei itences to be se i " . < • • • •
 Wl ^ / -.. i 
running the sentences consecutively, the trial judge stated, "[M]y understanding is that I 
don't have to make that election until I impose the sentence and I'll make that election 
paid in full. R. 77:6-7. This appeal follows. 
5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Once a trial court signs and enters a final order of judgment into the record and 
acts upon it, the sentence becomes final. After the order in this case became final, the 
trial court's authority and jurisdiction continued only over the defendant's probation 
terms. The trial court did not retain jurisdiction or authority over the case to increase the 
sentence originally imposed. The only jurisdiction and authority a trial court has at an 
order to show cause hearing is to revoke, modify, continue, or order the entire probation 
term to start over. In this case, the trial court entered a final order of judgment without 
ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Absent such an order by the court the 
sentences are presumed to run concurrently. The trial court erred in amending Mr. 
Jaramillo's original sentence and ordering it to be served consecutively after he violated 
his probation. The trial court's error violated Mr. Jaramillo's constitutional and statutory 
rights against double jeopardy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. WHERE A TRIAL COURT HAS SIGNED A FINAL ORDER OF 
JUDGMENT AND ENTERED IT INTO THE RECORD, THE COURT UPON 
REVOKING PROBATION CANNOT INCREASE THE SENTENCE 
ORIGINALLY IMPOSED. 
While a trial court has "continuing jurisdiction over all probationers," until the 
probation term is completed, it is without jurisdiction or authority once it acts on an order 
of judgment and sentence from amending the original sentence imposed upon revocation 
of probation. See Utah Code Ann. 77-18-1 (2)(b)(iii) (2003). In this case, the trial court 
erred after it revoked Mr. Jaramillo's probation and ordered the original sentence 
6 
imposed to be served consecutively rather than concurrently ' : :.u court's error 
violated Mr. Jaramillos constitutional and statutory rights against double jeopardy. 
"Ii 1 a I Jtal i ci iit i: lii lal :as = , a final ji ldgn lent occi irs when the trial court enters the 
written judgment of conviction, including the sentence, into the record." State v. Todd, 
2004 vpp _i„ , . .d 46, cert, granted, 109 I ' 3d 804, Ii ais case, tl le ti lal 
c ' - •»*! • ; ; - • ndgment on September 13 21)03 R 28; 
Addendum C. I he judgment imposed did not require that the sentences be served 
consecutively. Utah case law is clear that once a trial court signs and enters a final 
ji doni. . ' ^ sr-nien.' • ! r *--;ii ;nd the trial court 
loses jurisdiction to amend the sentence. See Stat z I" lontoya, 825 P.2d 6765 679 (Utah 
Ct. Arr 1^* * )nce a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter 
j 1 :ase ' " ). 
2
 This issue is preserved. An issue is properly preserved if '""the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on (he issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 
129 (Utah Ct. App. ! tJI>7) (citations omitted). Even though defense counsel did not 
specifically argue that ordering the sentences to be served consecutively would violate 
double jeopardy, she did argue that because the original judgment lacked a notation that 
the sentences were to run consecutively, the law presumes that they are to run 
concurrently. R. 77:5-6. The trial judge considered defense counsel's argument but 
rejected it on his belief that he does not "have to make that election until [he] impose[s] 
the sentence." R. 77:6. But even if the issue was not preserved, this Court should reverse 
because the trial court's error was plain. Error is plain if it "should have been obvious to 
the trial court" and was prejudicial. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^|13, 10 P.3d 346 
(citation omitted). In this case, the trial court's error was obvious because case law is 
clear that once an order of judgment/sentence is signed and entered inti the recon it 
becomes final and the trial court loses authority and jurisdiction to amend i 
Appellant's Brief 6-12 It was also prejudicial because the trial court, by ordei ;•:<. ]ie 
sentences to run consecutively, thereby increasing Mr. Jaramillo5s original sentem i\ 
punished Mr. Jaramillo twice for the same offense ^ee Arm'-ii-mtV n , ' ; p f A - p 
7 
While a final order does not exist when the trial court orally pronounces sentence 
but does not sign the judgment and the defendant does not commence serving it, once a 
final order of judgment has been signed and entered into the record, the trial court loses 
the authority and jurisdiction to amend the sentence. See State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Wright 904 P.2d 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In Curry, the defendant pled guilty to a second degree felony and a third degree 
felony with the state recommendation that the sentences be served concurrently. 814 
P.2d at 1150. On May 18, 1990, the trial court ordered sentences of one to fifteen years 
for the second degree felony and zero to five on the third degree felony to be served 
concurrently with one another. Id The defendant then sought to include additional 
information for the court's consideration in sentencing and "moved the court to set-aside 
the sentence and order a ninety-day evaluation." Id. The court held a hearing on May 23, 
1990, on the defendant's motion and filed a minute entry which stated '"I. THE COURT 
WILL NOT SIGN THE JUDGMENT, SENTENCE (COMMITMENT) THAT WAS 
ORDERED ON MAY 18, 1990. 2. THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO COMPLETE 
A 90 DAY EVALUATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. THE SENTENCE IS 
CONTINUED TO AUGUST 31, 1990 at 10:30 AM.'" Id (emphasis in original). On 
September 7, 1990, after the court had received the evaluation ordered, it "sentenced 
defendant to the same prison terms but ordered that they be served consecutively." Id, 
This Court held that the trial court's subsequent imposition of a consecutive sentence did 
not violate Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (1990) because the trial court's "oral statement. . . 
regarding defendant's sentence was not reduced to writing" until September 7 , 
8 
therefore, the sentence was not "'set aside5" within the meaning of that statute. Id. at 
1151. 
SiM- _._—_. dcf, V ,!•* V\K\\ <"VMV W ••**. cd p<- • ^ s - ' i i o i an 
incendiary device and the tr::il court ordered a presentence report, setting sentencing for 
June 20 904 P.2d at i * sentencing was continued until. . 4. when/\.\v:;3 
ft;]- ,-^*- •• »'«• "*<^  * ••'• sentence 
report was still not complete but "defense counsel urged the court, to proceed with 
sentencing." IdL 
The trial court annoui iced from the bench that is wouiu seniemv Wright to 
zero to five years in state prison, but that it would suspend HK pi ison term 
pending Wright's successful completion of a thirty-six month probation .»* ; 
period. [However, a]t a hearing held one week later, July 18, 1994, the trial 
court announced that it would not sign the proposed commitment order 
•~'H it had a chance to review the presentence report from AP&P. The trial 
1 stated, "There is no judgment, there is no sentence until I si**n those 
v,l"&. 
Id. (emphasis add 
the trial court to consider in sentencing Wright.*' IcL At the August 29 hearing, after 
reviewing the presentence report, the trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five years 
grant the defendant probation. IdL This Court determined that this defendant, like the one 
in Curry, "sought to include in the presentence report additional information for the trial 
cniiil irorisiclcralKiii .illei lln oral |iniiiiniiii rinenf til "n mil in r lllinil ill1 .ttlirt tine (m.ii 
court had indicated its intent to modify the originally announced sentence.' IcL In 
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affirming the trial court, this Court held that since the trial court's oral statement of 
sentencing had not been reduced to writing, the sentence was not entered until the time it 
was "reduced to writing and signed." Id. 
Unlike the trial court in Curry and Wright, the trial court in this case did reduce 
Mr. Jaramillo's sentence to writing and entered it into the record. R. 28; Addendum C. 
In addition, unlike the trial courts in those cases, the trial court in this case did not state 
on the record that it was refusing to sign the order pending the receipt of further evidence. 
Id. Nor did it indicate any intention of modifying the sentence in the future. Id Finally, 
unlike Curry and Wright, Mr. Jaramillo's sentence commenced on the date it was 
announced and Mr. Jaramillo began serving the sentence on that date. Once a trial court 
enters a final signed order of judgment into the record and a defendant begins serving a 
sentence, that sentence becomes final. See Todd, 2004 UT App 266 at |^10 n.l; Curry, 
814 P.2d at 1151; Wright, 904 P.2d at 1102. This insures that such clerical omissions do 
not affect the substantial rights of a defendant or undermine the justice system. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 30. Therefore, once the trial court entered a written order of judgment into 
the record, and acted on it, the order was final and the trial court lost the authority to do 
anything other than to impose the original sentence entered upon revocation of Mr. 
Jaramillo's probation. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-1 (12)(e)(iii). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 grants trial courts the authority after an order to show 
cause hearing to order "probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew." Id. at § 77-18-1 (12)(e)(ii). If the trial court 
10 
determines that probation should be revoked then the statute only allows the trial court 
the authority to either sentence the defendant if he has not previously been sentenced or 
defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed."; : 
this case, the trial court had entered a audi order o. judgment against Mr. Jaramillo on 
Therefore, the trial court was left only with the authorih * :ute the sentence 
previously imposed as it was entered into the record, luster ...v. ;nu! court at the 
ordered the terms to run consecutively with each oilier in w s; urn of the statute. R 61; 
77:6; Addendum A. 
In additi in llm ilim ill iiiiiif1. nrdn III.it llic ji.nl luiiiii h n'vnl i i nscnilivrh 
exceeds statutory authority and constitutes a more severe pium . originally 
ordered and violates Mi. J<t . .nilk/s constitutional and statutory protections against 
d : "i lble jeo] ":; I Jtal i C : i ist ai t I, § 12; I Jtal I Cc c! s ' iii: i 
§ 77-1-6 (2)(a) (2003). The filth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, 
^Hivuiiic u> t.„ states thro1!.^ u^ , ^urteenth. Amendment, protects individuals from.. 
n shments - <(r:v.~ s . amend. V (' tic-sh:il!-::*•. ^erson 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardv o: life or limb/'); Utah C-
art. I, > >o\ b'uL\ii ,iiiy person be twice put in jeopard} .. . the same OIICHSL, J, Utah 
Code Ann M """T I i i ""l(;i| i I" In person shall hv put twice in icoparcb Inrthe same 
offense."). "If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is 
11 
that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence. And . . . there has 
never been any doubt of [this rule's] entire and complete protection of the party when a 
second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the same facts, for the same 
statutory offence." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969) (quoting Ex parte 
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)). 
The United States Supreme Court determined long ago that double jeopardy is 
violated when a trial court increases a sentence after a defendant has commenced to serve 
it. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 176. "The Constitution was designed as much to prevent 
the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for 
it." Id. at 173. Therefore, the trial court violated double jeopardy in this case where it 
entered a final order of judgment and then later increased Mr. Jaramillo's sentence at the 
order to show cause hearing after he had already commenced serving it. The trial court 
was without jurisdiction or authority under either the constitution or statute to run Mr. 
Jaramillo's original sentence consecutively. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court exceeded its authority and jurisdiction by imposing Mr. 
Jaramillo's jail terms consecutively at the order to show cause hearing, Mr. Jaramillo, 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court error. 
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ADDENDUM A 
DEC-16-2004 THU 08:52 AM CP'M1NAL DEPT FAX NO. 801^87564 P. 05 
(CERTIFY THAT'. 
ORIGINAL DCCU& 
DISTRICT COURT 
OFUTAH. A f 
r>TRUECOer©EAN 
NtFILElNTHE^HmO 
"" *Y. STATE-
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
THOMAS MAX JARAMILLO, 
Defendant. 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE cdafej?^^ .-c 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH >^C&-ig#v*^** 
3 
• c- ** 
MINUTES 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021912690 MO 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: December 13, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHNSON, HEATHER 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 10, 1981 Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count; 10:37 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea; Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty 
3. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty 
7. INTOXICATION - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Oisposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty 
HEARING 
DEFT ADMITTS ALLEGATIONS 1-4-5-6-7-8 
DENIES ALLEGATIONS 2-3 C/O STRICKEN ON STATE MOTION 
C/O PROBATION REVOKED 
-DEFT TO SERVE JAIL TERM 
-C/O DEFT TO PAY FULL RESTITUTION - TO BE ENTERED AS A CIVIL JUDGMENT 
Page l 
DEC-16-2004THU 08:52 Atl CPTMNALDEPT 
FAX NO. 80^87564 P. 06 
Case No: 021912690 
Date: Dec 13, 2004 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 255 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(a) 
The total time suspended for this charge is. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
C/0 CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED 
Dated this f 2? day of 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) l b the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at anytime at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ADDENDUM C 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS MAX JARAMILLO, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021912690 MO 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: September 12, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: CHIN, AUGUSTUS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LILLY, CATHERINE L. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 10, 1981 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 10:33 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty 
3. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty 
7. INTOXICATION - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/26/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A VEHICLE a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 315 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
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COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 50 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service to be completed through Adult Probation & Parole. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $1200.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: UNKNOWN 
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 50 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
PAY $1,200.00 RESTITUTION 
SERVE 50 DAYS JAIL, CTS 
WORK 50 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE 
MAINTAIN STABLE RESIDENCE 
COMPLETE SUBSTANCE ABUSE EVALUATION AND COUNSELING 
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FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS 
Dated this JQ^ day of O ^ p 1 , 20 
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